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CHILD CARE LAND USE ORDINANCES-PROVIDING
WORKING PARENTS WITH NEEDED
DAY CARE FACILITIES
EMILY GREEN CAPLANt
There is a child care crisis' in this country.2 The problem of pro-
viding care for the children of working parents has been aptly described
as "one of the pressing domestic issues of this decade." 3 In order for
our working population to be most productive, its children must remain
safe and healthy through the operation of adequate child care facilities.
Recognition and repair of the child care problem must derive not only
from parents, social workers, and psychologists,4 but also from the legal
community, particularly those who make policy and effect it into law.'
The demographics of child care are dramatic. Eighty percent of
women now in the work force are of childbearing age,' and it is likely
that nine out of every ten will have children during their careers.' By
1990, it is estimated that there will be twenty-three million children
under the age of six, reflecting the results of a current baby boom.' It is
estimated that at least half of these children will require some form of
child care."
How will parents go about finding care for their children that is
t A.B. 1983, Harvard and Radcliffe Colleges; J.D. Candidate 1988, University of
Pennsylvania.
1 One commentator has suggested that the term "child care" be replaced by "child
day care." See Murray, Child Care and the Law, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 261, 261
n.2 (1985). This Comment agrees that this change in terminology is appropriate, but
acknowledges that its usage is not yet widely accepted. Therefore, in support of this
usage, this Comment uses "child care" to denote "less than 24-hour care of children for
the purpose of providing positive supervision while their parents work." Id.
2 See Schwartz, Good Day Care-A National Need, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1986, at
A23, col. 2; Walker, Guess Who's Minding the Kids? Day Care at the Office, BUILD-
ING ECON., Aug. 1986, at 19; Murray, supra note 1, at 262.
' Stevenson, Introduction to Child Care Symposium Issue, 25 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 239, 239 (1985).
" That is, those individuals traditionally entrusted with the care and protection of
children.
5 See Murray, supra note 1, at 263.
e H.R. SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, FAMILIES AND
CHILD CARE: IMPROVING THE OPTIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1180, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. v
(1984).
7 Id.
I See Murray, supra note 1, at 265; New Provisions for Child Care, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 4, 1985, at A18, col. 2 [hereinafter New Provisions].
I See Murray, supra note 1, at 265-66.
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satisfactory to all parties involved, namely parents, children, and em-
ployers? If the present situation persists, the search will be largely in
vain. Today, the demand for child care in and near the workplace far
exceeds the supply. 0 At some existing office park centers, for example,
the waiting list is "unbelievable."" Private employers, for the most
part, are reluctant to get involved directly in workplace child care pro-
grams for myriad reasons. 2 Many private centers that are not affiliated
with employers have been forced to close or curtail existing operations
because of increasing labor and insurance costs." The federal govern-
ment lacks a strong commitment to this area, 4 and what commitment it
has shown is being sharply reduced. 5 Leaders in business and govern-
ment simply are not providing enough assistance to alleviate the prob-
lem, chiefly because the traditional view that women should be respon-
sible for child care persists to an enormous extent in American
society.1
Existing alternatives are not amenable to or feasible for many par-
ents. Choice of child care arrangements "tends to be dictated by finan-
cial considerations, convenience, personal values, and beliefs about child
rearing .... .1" Many alternatives simply are too expensive and/or
unreliable. 8 Clearly, the business of juggling career and childrearing is
"frustrating and ... frightening"1 9 for working parents. Geography
also is a major obstacle. Many parents are loath to leave their very
10 As a point of reference, for example, 10,000 more children needed licensed day
care than there were spaces available in San Francisco in 1984. See Schmidt, Help for
Working Parents, IMAGE, Nov. 17, 1985, at 9.
"I Toddling Trends: Child Care Near the Office, Wall St. J., Oct.* 6, 1986, at 33,
col. 2 [hereinafter Toddling Trends].
12 Employer concerns include "costs, complex insurance arrangements, obligations
incurred by referrals, parental complaints, quality control, and equity issues," to name
a few. Friedman, Child Care for Employees' Kids, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar./Apr.
1986, at 28, 29. In addition, many employers see neither an economic nor a philosophi-
cal justification for their involvement. And, it must be remembered that there is no
existing legal way to force employers to provide child care facilities. See generally infra
notes 68-91 and accompanying text.
's See Schwartz, supra note 2; Walker, supra note 2, at 20.
See Meredith, Day-Care: The Nine-to-Five Dilemma, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
Feb. 1986, at 36, 38; see also Divine-Hawkins & Livingston, Preface to the Federal
Role in Child Care, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 247, 258-59 (1985) (calling for in-
creased efforts by the Federal Government, as well as by state and local governments
and the private sector, to respond to demographic trends in the labor force).
15 See Walker, supra note 2, at 20.
16 See, Meredith, supra note 14, at 38; Stevenson, supra note 3, at 241; 244.
17 Murray, supra note 1, at 265; see also Finley, Transcending Equality Theory:
A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118,
1118-19, 1122 (1986) (discussing traditional notions about men's and women's roles in
society).
18 See Meredith, supra note 14, at 38.
19 Id.
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young children miles away in the suburbs or in the next city without
the capacity for rapid access or, at the very least, convenient drop-off.
Thus, current methods are inadequate in meeting current needs for
child care, much less for meeting the constantly growing demand for
such services.
Solutions do exist. San Francisco, for example, has responded
openly and effectively to the child care problem, and it was the first
major American city2" to do so. Land use regulation was San Fran-
cisco's chosen vehicle for response. On September 10, 1985, Mayor
Dianne Feinstein signed into law the Downtown Plan, a schematic re-
vision of the city's planning code that included a child care ordinance."1
This ordinance22 requires developers who meet certain criteria to set
aside space for child care facilities in their office projects or, alterna-
tively, to pay a fee (in lieu of setting aside space) toward a citywide
fund for affordable child care.23 Part of an overall remodeling of regu-
lations and policies for downtown development, this ordinance places
some of the burden of providing convenient and affordable child care
upon the shoulders of developers who occasion the increased demand.24
The San Francisco law has been described as an "innovative"
measure, a piece of "landmark" legislation.25 This Comment demon-
strates that while such legislation is certainly new in the development
exaction context, it is not revolutionary in terms of legal history and
20 See New Provisions, supra note 8; New Requirements for Office Developers,
BUSINESSLINK, Spring 1986, at 5 [hereinafter New Requirements]. The City of Con-
cord, California actually passed the first child care ordinance in July of 1985. While
similar to the San Francisco ordinance, it is considerably less stringent in its require-
ments. See id.
21 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 315 (1986).
22 See infra notes 95-126 and accompanying text for discussion of the ordinance.
23 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 315(d) (1986).
24 By "occasion the increased demand," this Comment does not imply that devel-
opers are the "but for" cause of the need for additional child care facilities. No single
culprit is responsible for the growing demand for child care. The reasons why parents
enter the workplace are varied: economic necessity; inducement by employers via wage
incentives; and the need for self-fulfillment, to name a few. Instead, the language em-
ployed is intended to indicate that a child care land use ordinance can operate as the
first step in ensuring that such facilities are built. A child care land use ordinance is a
simple way of spreading around the costs of child care facilities, other than imposing a
citizen-wide tax, and operates by initially placing the burden on developers. Thereafter,
developers can pass on their added costs to their business tenants. Because developers
are in the best position to design and construct the needed facilities, requiring them to
do so will ensure that these facilities are built from the outset instead of as an
afterthought.
For an economic analysis of land use laws, see Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Eco-
nomic Theory, Practice, and Incidence, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (1987), and
Fischel, The Economics of Land Use Exactions: A Property Rights Analysis, 50 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (1987).
25 Schmidt, supra note 10, at 9.
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case precedent; therefore, its passage should not be avoided for fear of
outrageousness or rejection. San Francisco has done nothing particu-
larly far-fetched or extralegal. Rather, its ordinance comports well with
established land use law and policy and represents a logical step in the
evolution of land use legislation.
Part I sets the backdrop for an extended analysis of this ordinance
by reviewing briefly the child care efforts made in the private business
and legal sectors and describing why these efforts have been insufficient
to meet the crisis' demand. Part II then explains why land use regula-
tion is a viable solution. It begins with a description of the San Fran-
cisco ordinance itself and next discusses the way in which the ordinance
follows precedent by meeting court-articulated tests for development ex-
actions. Finally, Part III seeks to ground child care ordinances firmly
in the established rubric of development exactions for schools. Simply
stated, it argues that because a child care facility is merely another kind
of school, child care ordinances fit easily into an established area of
law. Consequently, they should be adopted into the land use codes of
all municipalities, where the demand so dictates.
I. CHILD CARE EFFORTS IN THE BUSINESS AND LEGAL SECTORS
For corporations there is an obvious self-interest in supporting and sub-
sidizing day care services. Employees who can rest assured that their
children are reliably and well cared for will be freed to work more
productively. In addition, city, state, and Federal governments should
become more involved. The only industrialized nation that lacks a na-
tional policy on child care is the United States.26
While child care has not gained widespread legitimacy and status
as a critical public issue, it has elicited some attention from both the
private sector and the legal community. Corporate employers increas-
ingly are researching the possibilities for involvement in child care, rec-
ognizing that the benefits of such involvement accrue not only to em-
ployees and their children, but ultimately to the corporation as well.17
In the legal arena, lawyers are beginning to recognize the need for their
"8 Schwartz, supra note 2. In Europe most countries have adopted child care poli-
cies modeled after those first advocated by the International Labor Office ("ILO") in
1952. See Finley, supra note 17, at 1172-73. Through such policy formation, the ILO
hoped to "make it possible for working women with families to combine their duties as
mothers and workers for the good of both families and society, because maternity is a
clearly recognized, important social function." Id. at 1173.
" Walker, supra note 2, at 20-22; see also Finley, supra note 17, at 1175
(describing benefits to employers).
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"significant role in building a rational and equitable child-care delivery
system," particularly through "advocat[ing] statutory reform by draft-
ing legislation and testifying at public hearings." '28 In fact, certain legis-
lative programs are already in place to assist parents in addressing their
child care needs and concerns.29
Notwithstanding these efforts and improvements, private and legal
measures remain sorely insufficient in meeting the current crisis; both
the corporate and legal communities are operating well below their ca-
pacities to grant assistance in the child care area. The limitations and
inadequacies of current efforts ultimately highlight the necessity for
creative and effective solutions.
A. Child Care Efforts in the Private Corporate Sector
Employer involvement in child care is not a new phenomenon.
Rather, child care in the workplace has existed in the United States for
several generations."0 Tellingly, industry first became involved in day-
time care of children because of pressing need. The exigencies of World
War II gave employers the incentive to provide child care for their em-
ployees.3 Concomitantly, the federal government responded by furnish-
ing labor-short industrial areas with fifty-one million dollars needed to
support three thousand day care centers. These centers were necessary
to attract much-needed women to the work place.
3 2
Corporate and governmental investments in child care, however,
declined substantially33 after the war ended. The change was due in
large part to the postwar ideology that "women should, if at all possi-
ble, stay at home and restore to their children and to the nation the
tight-knit family structure that had been disrupted by war."" This
view has changed somewhat due to economic developments over the
years, the practical need for two-income families, rising consumer ex-
pectations, women's liberation, 5 and, generally, women's large, persis-
28 Murray, supra note 1, at 263.
29 See, e.g., infra note 71 and accompanying text.
SO See Stein, The Company Cares for Children, in CHILD CARE-WHO CARES?
245, 245 (P. Roby ed. 1973).
Il See id. For example, shipyard owner W.J. Kaiser "cared for 3,811 children
during the war, freeing 1,931,827 women work hours." Id.
32 See id.; see also Kerr, One Step Forward-Two Steps Back: Child Care's Long
American History, in CHILD CARE-WHO CARES? 157, 162-65 (P. Roby ed. 1973).
"The U.S. entry into World War II occasioned a dramatic shift in the public attitude
toward the working mother and sparked a major federal investment in the care of her
children." Id. at 162.
33 See Kerr, supra note 32, at 165-67.
" Stein, supra note 30, at 246.
" The author does not mean to suggest here, of course, that child care is solely a
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tent, and valuable presence in the work force.36 However, the tradi-
tional, nostalgic, and what some might call archaic, view still reigns in
dominant circles."7
Most significantly for this Comment, while many employers seem
to recognize a need for their involvement, 8 they, as a group, are not
responding in numbers great enough to meet the demand. As of April,
1986, roughly 2,500 United States companies were assisting their em-
ployees with child care arrangements.3 9 This number represents an ex-
tremely low percentage of companies in this country.4 ° An estimated
44,000 medium- to large-size businesses have done little or nothing at
all to address employees' needs.41 While practical considerations"2 and
informational problems' help explain this discouraging situation,
traditional views regarding caretaker roles certainly have played an im-
portant part:
44
There is a persistent, deeply entrenched ideology in our
society. . . that men and women perform different roles and
occupy different spheres. The male role is that of worker
and breadwinner, the female role is that of childbearer and
rearer. The male sphere is the public world of work, of
politics, and of culture . . . . The female sphere is the pri-
vate world of family, home, and nurturing support for the
separate public activities of men. . . . The notion that the
world of remunerative work and the world of the home-or
the realms of production and reproduction-are separate,
has fostered the economic and social subordination of women
45
woman's concern.
11 "It is clear that both for financial and personal reasons the surge of women into
the workplace is going to continue." Meredith, supra note 14, at 38.
1 See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Finley, supra note 17, at
1118 (describing the entrenched ideology of separate roles for the sexes: a male one of
breadwinner and a female one of childbearer and childrearer).
I It must be stressed that "involvement" does not denote subsidization. Neither
the costs of building nor the expenses of operation are borne by employers. See Tod-
dling Trends, supra note 11 ("In most cases, the cost of building the centers is borne
by the office park's developers. Centers are typically operated independently, and em-
ployees pay to use them."); see also infra notes 50-64 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing ways in which employers can help alleviate the child care crisis).
SB See Friedman, supra note 12, at 28.
40 See Meredith, supra note 14, at 38.
41 See Friedman, supra note 12, at 28.
42 See supra note 12.
41 See Friedman, supra note 12, at 29 (Employers are "skeptical; productivity and
other gains are difficult to prove.").
" See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
4' Finley, supra note 17, at 1118-19.
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While the persistence of this ideology is baffling, more troubling is the
way in which it has distorted the ability of our market economy to
provide adequate child care facilities.46 No doubt many employers be-
lieve that the maintenance of this ideology works in their best interest.
However, research has revealed the falsity of this belief.
Companies have much to gain and little to lose from providing
child care options for their employees. Involvement in child care can
"increase recruiting, morale, productivity, and quality [of work], and
decrease accident rates, absenteeism, tardiness, and turnover. '47 More-
over, providing employees with child care facilities in or near the work-
place reduces stress, because having their children nearby helps em-
ployees balance work and family responsibilities. 48 This balance has
been identified as "the heaviest contributor to depression among em-
ployees, regardless of gender."'49 Consequently, companies can alleviate
employee stress and enhance employee productivity simultaneously by
ensuring that proper child care facilities are available to their workers.
Contrary to what may be a widespread belief, an employer can
help with child care other than by providing on-site or near-site facili-
ties. In fact, employers may help alleviate their employees' need for
child care in several ways,50 none of which forces the employer into the
business of child care. For instance, employers might help ease the
child care crisis by adopting a "cafeteria plan" of fringe benefits,5" and
then including dependent care as one of the benefits within the plan. In
utilizing this option, an employee is able to select from an assortment,
or menu, of available benefits. She may select those benefits that she
4' For a discussion of why industry has not taken an active role in the area of
child care, see supra note 12. See also Meredith, supra note 14, at 38 ("leaders in
business and government ... still tend to believe that the traditional family
predominates").
47 Friedman, supra note 12, at 28. Companies instituting child care plans "have
found that morale and productivity of employees go up .... " Finley, supra note 17,
at 1175.
48 See Friedman, supra note 12, at 28. These conclusions derive from regional
and national studies and surveys. See also Walker, supra note 2, at 20-25 (studies
indicate that providing child care results in reduced absenteeism and less employee
turnover).
" Friedman, supra note 12, at 28. As mentioned supra text accompanying note
19, this balance is of crucial importance to both parents and children: "The com-
promises parents make in juggling careers and rearing children often cause them to
worry that they are less fit parents. They have heard that they are damaging their
children's development, weakening the mother-child bond or even exposing them to
abuse or disease." Meredith, supra note 14, at 38.
50 See infra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
"I See Comment, Establishing Dependent-Care Programs Through Cafeteria
Plans: Fulfilling the Need for a Well-Balanced Benefit Menu, 25 SANTA CLARA L.
Rav. 455, 455 (1985) ("A 'cafeteria plan' is a group of. . . benefits offered by em-
ployers from which plan participants, the employees, may choose.").
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needs or prefers; and she may ignore those benefits unsuited to her
personal situation. "For example, an employee with children may
choose dependent care as a benefit rather than dental care or extensive
life insurance coverage."5 The employee often pays for the benefit
through deductions from her gross income.53
An employer who chooses to implement a cafeteria plan must de-
velop a written proposal describing the operation of the plan, revise the
corporate payroll to reflect salary deductions, and file tax returns cover-
ing the number of participating employees." Because employers pay
only for the benefits that their employees choose, they realize savings
whenever employees forego choosing more costly benefits in favor of
less costly ones.55 Thus, if a worker selects dependent care because she
has small children, the employer will save the incremental cost of hav-
ing to provide a more expensive benefit. Moreover, the employer profits
by having a more productive employee than before.
Although "'cafeteria plan[s]' . . . [are] an effective and efficient
way of increasing dependent-care benefits to those who need them,"5 6
employers have underutilized these plans. Such factors as the paucity of
established cafeteria plans in operation, the general lack of guidance in
establishing them, and the uncertain tax status of such plans have com-
bined to produce "a chilling influence on employers who would estab-
lish cafeteria plans that would include the option of dependent care."5"
As a result, the opportunity for employees to obtain dependent care
benefits through cafeteria plans is limited.
A second way employers may assist employees with their child
care needs is by merely offering current information about available
and reliable child care facilities. As one commentator has noted: "The
child care system is often fragmented, poorly advertised, and varied in
quality. A poor child care choice may translate into additional days off
from work when parents must look for new arrangements."58
Employers may bridge the information gap by engaging the ser-
vices of local agencies that list and refer parents to child care providers
in a given area. Indeed, IBM has gone so far as to "create[] a national
contractor. . . to identify local resources and referral programs for em-
ployees in its 200 plant sites." 59 Because information concerning child
52 Id. at 461.
53 See id.
5 See id. at 464-65.
55 See id. at 465.
56 Id. at 455.
57 Id. at 457.
58 Friedman, supra note 12, at 29.
59 Id. at 31.
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care is scarce, such community referrals are boons to those employees
attempting to identify available child care services. A referral program
also serves the employer, because an employee is able to work more
steadily and effectively when her child care problem is alleviated. But
despite the effectiveness and feasibility of referral systems, only 500
companies engage in contracting with local agencies to provide this
needed service. 60
A third way employers might help is by offering flexible work
schedules to their employees with young children. Personnel policies
fashioned to take into account parents' needs in caring for and spending
time with their children are extremely important to employees.61 These
policies include pregnancy leave, parental leave,62 part-time work, job
sharing, and paid leave to care for sick children.6" Some of these poli-
cies are slowly being implemented in major American companies; how-
ever, such implementation is still "in the early stages of
development.""
The employer assistance programs described above suffer from one
common drawback: they are all completely discretionary. On-site cor-
porate child care centers might indeed be the "wave of the future," ' 5
but only if corporate managers so decide. Until then, employees who
desperately need child care for their children are left to fend for them-
selves. Even when employers do provide corporate child care centers for
their employees, chances are that the waiting list is "unbelievable,"
with the result that "[m]ost mothers will make reservations for the child
when they determine they are pregnant." '66 This state of affairs indi-
cates that discretionary corporate facilities do not necessarily fulfill the
robust demand for such centers.67
60 See id. at 29.
61 See Murray, supra note 1, at 281-82.
12 Men, as well as women, are becoming increasingly interested in leave opportu-
nities. A particular man's level of interest may vary, however, depending on his voca-
tion. See, e.g., Project, Law Firms and Lawyers with Children: An Empirical Analysis
of FamilylWork Conflict, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1263, 1264 (1982).
63 See Murray, supra note 1, at 281.
Id. (referring to 1985); see Max, Parental Leaves: U.S. Lags Far Behind
Other Western Nations, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1986, § 1, at 23, col. 1 (Regarding
parental leave, "American workers are still forced to rely on a patchwork of personnel
policies and union contracts that leave most workers, including 60 percent of working
mothers, unprotected.").
6" Toddling Trends, supra note 11.
" Id.
617 The San Francisco system contains provisions that affirmatively require mini-
mum square footage and assessment of child care needs of an office project's prospective
tenants. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 315(d)(2)(c), (5) (1986).
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B. Child Care and the Law
At present, there is no legal avenue by which to compel private
employers to provide child care facilities for their employees. Any legal
intervention would controvert basic policies and notions concerning the
free market and freedom of contract. As mentioned above, any em-
ployer-provided child care is completely initiative-based, introduced and
implemented on a discretionary basis. As easily as it is provided, it can
just as easily be taken away.
During 1987, the 100th Congress will consider a parental leave
bill."' The proposed law, introduced by Representative Patriia
es The proposed Parental and Medical Leave Act states, in relevant part:
(a) In General.-
(1) An Employee shall be entitled to 18 workweeks of parental leave
during any twenty-four month period-
(A) because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee;
(B) because of the placement, for adoption or foster care, of a son or
daughter with the employee; or
(C) in order to care for the employee's son or daughter who has a
serious health condition.
(2) Such leave may be taken on a reduced leave schedule, in which
case-
(A) the total period during which the eighteen workweeks may be
taken may not exceed thirty-six consecutive workweeks,
(3) In the case of a child who has a serious health condition, such
leave may be taken intermittently when medically necessary.
(b) Unpaid Leave Permitted-Such leave may consist of unpaid leave
H.R. 4300, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The proposed bill allows for the option of
shortened workweeks and would establish a commission to recommend means by which
to provide salary replacement for employees taking parental leave.
Thus far, the bill has received enthusiastic support during congressional hearings.
See Unpaid Leave for Parents Supported at Joint House Comm. Hearing, Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1505-06 (Oct. 21, 1985); Parental Leave Advances
in House, Gov't EmpI. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 833 (June 16, 1986). This bill
follows a decade of challenges in the courts to existing child care laws. In De Ia Cruz v.
Tormey, 582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979), a group of
plaintiffs attempted to establish a legal right to employer-provided child care on both
statutory and constitutional grounds. Arguing theories of sex discrimination under Title
IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982), and equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, the low-in-
come, female plaintiffs claimed that a community college's refusal to provide child care
facilities caused an adverse impact upon their educational opportunities and thereby
violated guaranteed rights. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, 582 F.2d at 48; the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded for further hearings, id. at 64. However, plaintiffs' theory that
the accessibility of child care is related to educational opportunity failed to establish
precedent. The case was settled before a rehearing could be held.
Although this theory was successful with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, it has proven unsuccessful in other courts. See, e.g., Goicoechea v. Mountain
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Schroeder (D) of Colorado, would require employers engaged in inter-
state commerce to grant parents, both male and female, a maximum of
eighteen weeks of unpaid leave every two years to care for children,
without prejudice to the parents' seniority or benefits status. 9
This bill would augment several government programs already in
place. °70 One tax program that assists parents in meeting child care
needs provides tax credits to eligible families who pay child care ex-
penses for children under the age of fifteen. 7 Employers who include
Dependent Care Assistance Plans among employee benefits or who oth-
erwise provide child care services for their employees receive tax bene-
fits that include a range of deductions from business expenses to
targeted jobs tax credits. Tax benefits are given to employers who pro-
vide child care services for their employees and/or include Dependent
Care Assistance Plans among employee benefits. While helpful, these
tax programs are not widely used. Moreover, even if their use grew
significantly, it is unlikely that the programs could ever provide a sub-
stantial share of needed child care assistance. 3
Child care funding for low-income families is available through
Title XX of the Social Security Act. 4 In addition, these families may
receive assistance from services such as the Child Care Food Program"'
and Head Start". The Child Care Food Program ("CCFP") is oper-
ated by the United States Department of Agriculture. Initially, the De-
partment provides funds to state agencies. Once eligibility is estab-
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting Title VII claim that
travel requirements of job adversely affected employment opportunities because of in-
terference with child care responsibilities); see also Comment, Title IX, Disparate Im-
pact and Child Care: Can a Refusal to Cooperate in the Provisions of Child Care
Constitute Sex Discrimination Under Title IX?, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 271 (1981)
(examining the potential for the use of federal statutes to support claims alleging sexual
discrimination for failure to provide child care at public institutions).
6 See supra note 68.
70 See Divine-Hawkins & Livingston, supra note 14, at 249-56; WOMEN'S Bu-
REAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FEDERAL FUNDS FOR DAY CARE PROJECTS 10, 12, 21,
49 (1987).
71 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 26 U.S.C. § 21 (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
72 See Divine-Hawkins & Livingston, supra note 14, at 250.
73 Id.
74 42 U.S.C. § 1397(f) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (providing that expenditures
made by the states to assist "qualified provider[s] of child day care services" shall be
deemed to satisfy the goals of federal funding); see also 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(iii)
(1982 & Supp. 111 1985) (codification of the Social Services Block Grant that directs
states to disregard from earned income expenditures for dependent child care when
determining eligibility for a state plan "for aid and services to needy families with
children").
75 42 U.S.C. § 1766 (1982).
'Is 42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-9868 (1982).
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lished," state agencies allocate funds to local child care centers and
programs, which use them to provide nutritious food to needy children.
Children who receive food through the CCFP attend child care facili-
ties as well as licensed or approved family day care homes.78
While the CCFP has been identified as "a significant program
subsidy which allows providers to keep fees low while serving nutri-
tious meals,"79 the program suffers in two respects. First, setting up a
CCFP contract is a complex, bureaucratically rigid exercise. The re-
quirements imposed on providers are numerous-even onerous.8" Sec-
ond, allocation disputes often occur, occasionally resulting in costly and
lengthy lawsuits.8"
Head Start is "the largest federal program expenditure for pre-
school care,"82 serving over 400,000 children. 3 Children eligible for
Head Start programs are provided health, educational, and nutritional
services."' Although not by its original design, Head Start is commonly
known as a child care system. Children enroll in Head Start as they
would in private child care centers. Unfortunately, 85% of Head Start
centers do not stay open throughout the full work day. 5 Thus, working
parents of Head Start children must make additional arrangements to
meet their needs.
The Federal Government recently has reduced federal aid for
child care.8 ' The reductions have been large enough to force thirty-two
states to slash their public child care assistance programs.87 The dimin-
ishing federal commitment to child care 8 underscores the unfortunate
reality that-the national agenda does not include child care on its list of
priorities.89 While what remains of existing programs does provide
77 See 7 C.F.R. § 226 (1986); 42 U.S.C. § 1766(a) (1982).
78 See Child Care Food Program, Umbrella Sponsorship for Family Day Care
Homes 1 (Sept. 1986) (Fact Sheet from the Children's Foundation).
79 Murray, supra note 1, at 298.
80 Id.
81 See id.; 7 C.F.R. § 226 (1986). The Child Care Food Program is carefully
regulated. Providers must follow precise guidelines for every aspect of the program,
ranging from the specific type and quantity of foods offered at each meal to what ad-
ministrative records must be kept. The inability to adhere perfectly to such a scheme
provides an easy target for hopeful litigants.
82 Murray, supra note 1, at 296.
88 Id.
Id. Children are eligible when their parents are in the lower categories. See id.
85 See id. at 296 (citing H. BLANK, CHILDREN AND THE FEDERAL CHILD CARE
CuTs 3 (1983)).
88 See Walker, supra note 2, at 20.
87 Id.
88 But see Meredith, supra note 14, at 38 (there is a "rising tide" of congressional
interest in child care).
88 See Schwartz, supra note 2.
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some necessary and valuable services, the services in no way meet the
growing need for child care. By answering growing demand with les-
sening supply, our government exacerbates the child care crisis.
As one commentator has stated, "[b]oth business and government
are making some progress toward aiding working parents, but it's a
'good news-bad news' situation.""0 Corporations are offering various
forms of assistance, but in numbers too low to make a large enough
impact on the problem. Moreover, because managers provide assistance
at their discretion, programs inevitably are perceived to be unreliable
and unpredictable. Similarly, although legislative programs operate to
help parents with child care, they are not as effective as they might
be.
91
Creative solutions are needed to alleviate the child care crisis. One
such solution is a child care land use ordinance. The next part of this
Comment will examine the way in which the municipal government of
San Francisco has decided to address the demonstrated need for child
care through such an ordinance.
II. THE VALIDITY OF CHILD CARE ORDINANCES
Like many major cities in the United States, San Francisco has
been experiencing a shortage of adequate child care facilities. A city-
commissioned study of the San Francisco work force found that the
urgency of the child care problem mandated governmental action, espe-
cially in light of increasing building development in the city.9" Accord-
ing to the study, the link between the child care shortage and the inci-
dence of development had two components. First, "[n]ew office
development would unquestionably add to [the number of single parent
and two-earner families], exacerbating the child care shortage." ' Sec-
ond, the office vacancy rate in the city was rising at a rapid pace. "City
planners were looking carefully at the market and found nearby com-
munities were attracting many potential San Francisco tenants, in part
90 Meredith, supra note 14, at 38.
91 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
11 See New Requirements, supra note 20, at 5.
The results of the study highlighted for planners, politicians, and business
leaders that child care is an urgent problem .... The study, together
with numerous articles in the local and national press about child care,
and a Child Care Information Kit distributed by the California Child
Care Resources and Referral Network, provided an effective education ef-
fort throughout the city.
93 Id.
1987] 1603
1604 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
because of the availability of on-site child care."" A swift and effective
legislative response, the study concluded, would serve important inter-
ests of both working parents and the downtown community as a whole.
A. The San Francisco Ordinance
The San Francisco Child Care Ordinance affirmatively addresses
child care needs:
[O]ffice developments over 50,000 square feet throughout the
city [are required] to set aside space for an on-site child care
facility or contribute at a rate of one dollar per square foot
into an Affordable Child Care Fund, the purpose of which is
to expand and ease access to child care facilities serving low
and moderate income families.95
The ordinance recently has been amended to include hotels and to al-
low the construction of near-site facilities.96
According to currently proposed regulations, developers will not
become directly involved in the business of child care; rather, they pro-
vide space97 or donate money to accommodate needs generated by their
development. In this way, developers must participate only minimally
in the actual business of child care, an area in which most have little or
no experience. By choosing to donate money for the construction of an
off-site child care center, a developer will release herself completely
from any further responsibilities.
The proposed regulations require a development project sponsor
who chooses to provide an on-site facility to follow certain procedures.
Initially, the sponsor must screen and select a non-profit provider of
child care pursuant to a "request for proposal" procedure.9" The pro-
vider and sponsor then work together to assess the child care needs of
the project, primarily by surveying prospective tenants of the project.9
The provider prepares a "work program" for review by the Office of
9 Id.
"' A. Cohen & C. Stevenson, Testimony of the Child Care Law Center Before the
San Francisco Planning Commission in Support of Proposed Amendments to the Child
Care Ordinances of the Planning Code I (available at Child Care Law Center, San
Fransisco).
96 See San Francisco, Cal., Planning Code, §§ 314, 314.3 (1987).
97 It has been proposed that non-profit child care providers should be allowed to
operate the centers. Id. at § 314.4(b). According to the proposals, employers may also
elect to install their own non-profit centers. See Schmidt, supra note 10, at 9. In both
cases, employees may be required to pay to use the facilities.
See Proposed Regulations, July 28, 1986, at 14.
See id. at 13-14.
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Community Development. °0 If approved, a final lease and operating
agreement is negotiated by the parties.1 "1
The lease, effective for a minimum term of three years, is provided
"without charge to the provider for rent; utilities, property taxes, build-
ing services, repairs or any other services of any nature .. "..,2 In
addition to complying with all local and state laws, the facility must
have a minimum gross floor area of 3,000 square feet. 0 3 Space for the
facility is to be provided for the life of the development project. 0
Alternatively, a development project sponsor may elect to satisfy
the Child Care requirement in conjunction with other developers or by
instituting a near-site facility. The Consolidated On-Site Child Care
Facility provision allows sponsors located within one-half mile of each
other "to provide a single child care facility on the premises of one of
their development projects."1 5 The Near-Site Child Care Facility pro-
vision allows a sponsor to provide a facility within one mile of the de-
velopment project. 0 6 Both of these provisions add efficiency and flexi-
bility to the San Francisco program.
Instead of providing a child care facility, a development project
sponsor may choose to pay an in lieu fee. The amount of this fee is
calculated in the following way: Net additional gross square feet office
or hotel spaceX$1.00 = Total fee. 107 The fee is paid to the Controller
in return for a certification of payment.1 08 A developer may elect both
to pay an in lieu fee and provide an on-site or near-site facility. In such
a case, the in lieu fee is offset by the number of square feet used for the
facility.109 Again, an element of flexibility is afforded the sponsor in
meeting the requirements.
The ordinance provides for continuing evaluation of child care
needs in the city as well as evaluation of the ordinance's efficacy in
meeting those needs.1 10 If, after conducting empirical studies, the Plan-
ning Commission finds that the child care ordinance results in require-
ments disproportionately high to the need for child care, corrective
measures can be taken. "The Commission shall adjust any sponsor's
requirement and the formulae set forth [in the ordinance] so that the
100 Id.
101 See id. at 14-16.
102 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., PLANNING CODE § 314.4(b)(A) (1987).
103 See id. at § 314.4(b)(C).
104 See id. at § 314.4(b).
105 Id. at § 314.4(b)(2).
106 See id. at § 314.4(b)(3).
107 Id. at § 314.4(b)(4).
108 See id.
100 See id. at § 314.4(b)(5).
110 See id. at § 314.8.
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amount of the exaction is set at the level necessary to provide child care
for the employees attracted to office and hotel development projects
subject to [the ordinance]."'' This adjustment includes a refund of the
portion of fees paid, or reduction of the "set aside" space required by
the ordinance in excess of this level.
1 12
B. The San Francisco Ordinance as a Land Use Law
The San Francisco Child Care Ordinance discussed above is a
land use law. Land use laws in general regulate the development and
use of physical space in a municipality. 13 The interplay among prop-
erty development, the influx of residents, and the need for increased
services causes the need for land use laws. But "[tihe increased demand
for . . . services raises the difficult question of how a community
should finance such services and programs without overburdening ei-
ther the already strained property base or existing local residents who
have already contributed to the financing of existing improvements." 4
A community can opt to accommodate these needs by enacting land use
laws that target developers. This option is particularly effective if mar-
ket failure "prevents the market from achieving an efficient allocation
of land uses" and the city can "predict the course of the market and
• . . draw a zoning map that will be filled in efficiently over time. ' 1 5
The community must ensure, however, that its laws will stand up to
judicially-created tests in the event that a developer later challenges
their validity in court.
One can view the San Francisco Child Care Ordinance as either a
development exaction or as a piece of linkage legislation. A develop-
ment exaction is
the required construction of physical improvements, dedica-
tion of land, or fees in lieu of construction or dedication that
municipalities require from a developer as a condition of ap-
proving the building of the project. Thus, in order to build,
111 Id.
112 See id.
1 See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (sustaining restric-
tions on residential development); Penn Central Transp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978) (sustaining restrictions on commercial development); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (sustaining restrictions on industrial
development).
114 D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVEL-
OPMENT CONTROL LAW 202 (2d ed. 1986).
115 Tarlock, Euclid Revisited, 34 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 4, 7 (1982); see
also Komesar, Housing, Zoning and the Public Interest, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
218, 220-23 (1978) (presenting different economic models of land use law).
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the developer must pay for or build facilities to ameliorate
the externalities allegedly caused by its project, all of which
would otherwise be provided by the local government, if at
all.11
6
The San Francisco ordinance qualifies as a development exaction be-
cause it mandates either land dedications or payment of in lieu fees.
Just as subdivision developers are required to provide local residents
with streets, sidewalks, sewers, water lines, schools, parks, police and
fire stations, and open space 17 when their developments create the need
for these improvements, San Francisco developers must likewise accom-
modate the municipality by providing space or money for newly-needed
child care. L8
A linkage regulation is functionally equivalent to a development
exaction. "In recent years, the idea of a mandatory tithe for land devel-
opers has appeared in the form of local regulations that condition the
approval of certain types of land development. . . that further particu-
lar public purposes."119 Linkage programs place the burden of remedy-
ing public services shortages upon developers who create the need for
such services.
A linkage theory has been used to require developers of "[lob-
generating facilities"' 20 to build low-income housing for workers drawn
to the new development.' 2 For example, the San Francisco Office/
Housing Production Program1 22 is premised upon the rationale that
" Connors & Meacham, Paying the Piper: What Can Local Governments Re-
quire as a Condition of Development Approval?, 1986 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING &
EMINENT DOMAIN 2-2. See generally Connors & High, The Expanding Circle of Ex-
actions: From Dedication to Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 69, 70-72 (1987)
(discussing the evolution of exactions from intradevelopmental dedication of land for
streets, sidewalks, water and sewer lines to linkage payments used to implement social
policy).
117 See generally D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 114, at 202-12
(discussing exactions keyed to municipal approval of a subdivision); Note, Subdivision
Exactions: A Review of Judicial Standards, 25 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
269 (1983) [hereinafter Subdivision Exactions] (advocating a reasonableness standard
for reviewing subdivision exactions); Note, Subdivision Land Dedication: Objectives
and Objections, 42 STAN. L. REV. 419 (1975) [hereinafter Subdivision Land Dedica-
tion] (analyzing the economics of subdivision exactions); Note, Subdivision Exactions:
Where is the Limit?, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 400 (1967) [hereinafter Limit] (arguing
that subdivision exactions prevent developers from receiving unfair gains at the expense
of the public).
11 See Connors & Meacham, supra note 116, at 2-30.
Bosselman & Stroud, Mandatory Tithes: The Legality of Land Development
Linkage, 9 NovA L.J. 381, 381 (1985).
120 Id. at 390.
"I See id.
122 For a comprehensive discussion of OHPP, see Diamond, The San Francisco
OfficelHousing Program: Social Policy Underwritten by Private Enterprise, 7 HARV.
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since developers simultaneously receive substantial benefits from devel-
oping office projects and impose social costs upon the community, the
municipality is entitled to use "windfall recapture devices . . . to
recoup part of the governmental costs associated with new
development.
'123
The San Francisco Child Care Ordinance has been described as a
linkage regulation;124 indeed, it "links" the development of office and
hotel projects to the increased need for child care. This linkage also has
been referred to as a "downtown development exaction"'126 because it is
a municipally-established precondition of construction. Whether the
San Francisco ordinance is termed a linkage payment or a development
exaction, however, does not decide its validity. Judicial analysis likely
would be the same were the law termed a traditional development ex-
action or a linkage program.126
C. Meeting the Tests
The San Francisco ordinance has not been challenged in court ei-
ther as a development exaction or as a linkage payment.1 27 But future
challenges to similar ordinances are not unlikely. Child care does not
yet occupy a recognized, legitimate place in America's social or legisla-
tive policy; its novelty in the legal sphere is bound to arouse contro-
versy-even hostility.
While developers and Chambers of Commerce "appear to be con-
ENVTL. L. REV. 449 (1983). See also Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Require-
ments to Community Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of
Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 25-30 (1987) (arguing
that linkage fees approach "'grand theft' as the benefit to private land owners has
become marginal ... and the public need attributable to new development more tenu-
ous and theoretical").
123 Hagman & Misczynski, Executive Summary, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS
xxxv (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978), quoted in Diamond, supra note 122,
at 455.
124 See New Requirements, supra note 20, at 5; Connors & Meacham, supra note
116, at 2-22.
IL5 Connors and Meacham, supra note 116, at 2-20.
121 See Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 119, at 411 ("[Ljinkage programs should
be required to meet the same tests that have evolved for measuring the validity of other
forms of development exaction."); Connors & Meacham, supra note 116, at 2-25 ("Be-
cause of the many similarities between linkage programs and more traditional subdivi-
sion exactions, a court confronted by a challenge to linkage should apply [the same
standards used] to evaluate the legality of ordinances imposing . . . suburban
exactions.").
127 In fact, some developers support the measure, citing a desire "to give some-
thing back to the city." New Requirements, supra note 20, at 6 (quoting James
Bronckema, president of the company developing the Embarcadero Center West).
Others, however, merely acquiesce because, for one reason, they do not want to jeop-
ardize their ability to obtain building permits. See id.
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tent to pay the necessary price '  at the present time, this situation
may change if other municipalities follow San Francisco's progressive
lead in passing child care ordinances. If frustrated by the added costs of
the exaction, developers might seize upon a municipality's lack of statu-
tory authority to impose child care exactions. Even if statutory author-
ity existed, developers could claim that the imposition of the exaction
was an unreasonable regulation exceeding the municipality's police
powers. This section of the Comment, therefore, hypothesizes a chal-
lenge for the purpose of analyzing these allegations and their relation to
the law as defined by judicially-articulated tests.
With regard to land use laws generally, because states assume
somewhat different postures toward development exactions, they do not
apply any universal test. 29 The three tests that are regularly applied 30
include: the strict need test, 3 the specifically and uniquely attributable
test,"8 2 and the rational nexus test.' Since the case law indicates that
different approaches are taken in the context of exaction challenges,
even within the framework of these tests,"8 " a description of each
follows.
The strict need test is best suited to internal exactions,"3 5 such as
those for utilities,' in suburban, residential areas. To some extent,
then, hypothetical application of the strict need test to the San Fran-
cisco ordinance is inapposite, since the law covers mainly downtown
San Francisco. The basic rationale of the strict need test, however, is
still worth noting: the new subdivision must create a need, occasioned
128 Connors & Meacham, supra note 116, at 2-31.
129 See Connors & Meacham, supra note 116, at 2-11 (the order in which courts
consider legal questions can change the results); Subdivision Exactions, supra note
117, at 283 (introducing the three commonly-used tests).
130 See Subdivision Exactions, supra note 117, at 283 (noting a fourth test, the
privilege test, that "has since fallen from favor").
131 See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
132 See infra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
113 See infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
114 See Staples, Exactions-Mandatory Dedications and Payments in Lieu of
Dedication, 1980 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 111, 144 ("As the
cases . . . indicate[], any court in any state may hold either way on the question de-
pending mainly upon the wording of the enabling statute and the actual exaction re-
quired thereunder."); A. DAWSON, LAND USE PLANNING AND THE LAW 50 (1982).
135 In subdivisions, internal exactions provide for effects created within the subdi-
vision. External exactions, however, provide for effects created outside the subdivision.
For example, requiring a developer to construct streets within a subdivision is an inter-
nal exaction. On the other hand, requiring the developer to build a sufficiently wide
road to the subdivision is an external exaction. See Subdivision Exactions, supra note
117, at 272-79 (distinguishing by use of examples between internal and external
exactions).
138 See Comment, Subdivision Exactions: The Constitutional Issues, the Judicial
Response and the Pennsylvania Situation, 19 VILL. L. REV. 782, 788 (1974).
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by an influx of newcomers, that strains existing facilities in order for
the exaction to be valid.""7 Thus, a development exaction is justified
only if it is "based on the reasonably anticipated burdens to be caused
by the development."1 8
The specifically and uniquely attributable test adds an extra di-
mension to the strict need test. Not only must the development create
the need, but the need must be specifically and uniquely attributable to
the particular development at issue.1"' For example, if a municipality
requires a developer to dedicate land for a park, the need for that park
must be directly attributable to the residents introduced by that devel-
oper's project and not attributable to a general need that the developer's
project merely heightens. Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court, in the
landmark case of Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount
Prospect, 140 has stated that an exaction scheme is invalid if the need is
due to the "total development of the community"1 '' and not the specific
development project itself.
A recent New Hampshire case illustrates an application of the
specifically and uniquely attributable test and the court's readiness to
invalidate an ordinance within its somewhat restrictive contours. In
J.E.D. Associates v. Town of Atkinson, 4" the court overturned an ordi-
nance compelling developers to dedicate a certain amount of acreage or
pay an in lieu fee to the municipality. The court held that the need for
acreage was not specifically attributable to the particular development.
Rather, the ordinance was more akin to an "arbitrary blanket require-
ment;"143 therefore, it was impermissible.
Although a "strong minority"'144 of jurisdictions apply the Pioneer
test, if applied to the San Francisco ordinance, validity might be diffi-
cult to prove under a specifically and attributable analysis. While a
major premise of the law is that "[t]he scarcity of child care in the City
is due in great part to large office and hotel development . . . which
has attracted and will continue to attract additional employees and resi-
137 See id.
11 Lampton v. Pinaire, 610 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (sustaining an
exaction for road construction).
119 See D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 114, at 209; Subdivision
Exactions, supra note 117, at 285; Subdivision Land Dedication, supra note 117, at
441-42.
140 22 Ill. 2d 375, 380, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961) ("If the requirement is within
the statutory grant of power to the municipality and if the burden cast upon the subdi-
vider is specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity, then the requirement is
permissible . . ").
141 Id. at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
142 121 N.H. 581, 432 A.2d 12 (1981).
143 Id. at 585, 432 A.2d at 15; see Subdivision Exactions, supra note 117, at 286.
144 Subdivision Exactions, supra note 117, at 285.
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dents to the City,"'14 5 the already-existing scarcity is a result of other
factors as well. Consequently, the uniquely attributable connection may
be "impossible to prove conclusively where the cumulative effect of
multiple developments rather than the presence of a single one pro-
duces the strain and justifies the exaction scheme."' 46 On the other
hand, San Francisco,147 or any similar municipality, conceivably could
amass enough empirical evidence to delineate a concrete relationship
between particular developments and the consequent influx of new em-
ployees with child care needs. The data would have to be extremely
specific, however, to meet this demanding test so as to avoid having the
relationship between the development and the need labeled "attenu-
ated."14 The municipality, therefore, must affirmatively prove that the
amount and use of dedicated space are directly correlated to the influx
of new employees; otherwise, a court will view the exaction as an un-
constitutional tax levied to address an overall community problem." 9
In contrast to the specifically and uniquely attributable test, the
rational nexus test is applied by a majority of jurisdictions. 50 This test,
derived from a reexamination of the Pioneer test by the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls,"'1 is less re-
strictive than Pioneer. It requires a "reasonable connection" between
the new development and the needed facilities. If proof of the "reasona-
ble connection"1 52 is presented, thus establishing the essential nexus of
the test, then the exaction scheme is a valid exercise of the municipal-
ity's police power.153
Proponents of child care ordinances should not have much trouble
leaping the "rational nexus" hurdle. The San Francisco law, for in-
145 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., PLANNING CODE § 314.2 (1987).
148 Connors & Meacham, supra note 116, at 2-14.
147 It should be noted that California actually applies the rational nexus test in
exaction challenge cases. See Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
148 Subdivision Exactions, supra note 117, at 292-93.
"19 See Subdivision Land Dedication, supra note 117, at 441-42.
110 See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROILS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 755 (1981); Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 119, at 397; Connors &
Meacham, supra note 116, at 2-14; Subdivision Exactions, supra note 117, at 287; see
also supra note 147 (stating that California uses the rational nexus test).
"1 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4
(1966). Jordan actually does not call the test "rational nexus." This phrase was
"coined by commentators" to reflect the "reasonable connection" language in the case.
See Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Governments' Capital
Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415, 431 n.93 (1981); Comment, supra note
136, at 802-07.
152 28 Wis. 2d at 618, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
183 Id. at 619, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
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stance, states:
Projections from the EIR for the Downtown Plan indi-
cate that between 1984 and 2000 there will be an increase of
nearly 100,000 jobs in the C-3 District under the Downtown
Plan. Most of that employment growth will occur in office
and hotel work, which consist of a predominantly female
work force.
According to the survey conducted of C-3 District work-
ers in 1981, 65 percent of the work force was between the
ages of 25-44. These are the prime childbearing years for
women, and the prime fathering years for men. The survey
also indicated that only 12 percent of the C-3 District jobs
were part-time, leaving up to 88 percent of the positions oc-
cupied by full-time workers. All of these factors point to the
inevitable increase in the number of working parents in the
C-3 District and the concomitant increase in need for acces-
sible, quality child care.
The Master Plan encourages "continued growth of
prime downtown office activities so long as un-desirable con-
sequences of such growth can be avoided" and requires that
there be the provision of "adequate amenities for those who
live, work and use downtown." In light of these provisions,
the City should impose requirements on developers of office
and hotel projects designed to mitigate the adverse effects of
the expanded employment facilitated by such projects."'
In short, if a municipality can show that the development is ex-
pected to cause a substantial influx of new employees who will need
child care facilities in order to live and work successfully, then the ra-
tional nexus test is satisfied. The consequent need for child care in such
a context is comparable to already litigated needs for schools, 155 parks
and recreational services,""6 canals,1 57 and sewer systems,158 to name a
14 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., PLANNING CODE § 314.2 (1987).
5' See Jordan, 28 Wis. 2d at 620, 137 N.W.2d at 448-49; Builders Ass'n of
Santa Clara-Santa Cruz Counties v. Superior Ct., 13 Cal. 3d 225, 529 P.2d 582, 118
Cal. Rptr. 158 (1974); Board of Educ. Dist. No. 68 v. Surety Developers, 63 Ill. 2d
193, 347 N.E.2d 149 (1975).
5 See Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484
P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Billing
Properties Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964); Home
Builders Ass'n v. City of Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); Jenad,
Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966);
Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970); Call v.
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few.
Another way to analyze an exaction scheme is to ask two major
questions that subsume the central issues discussed in the case law.'59
The first is what is the "relationship of the pressures caused by the
project to the improvement that the municipality proposes to exact."' 60
Inherent in this inquiry are constitutional concerns. If the exaction re-
quirement is proportionate to the need, then no constitutional problem
exists; developers are neither forced to donate more than their fair
share' nor compelled to relinquish the right to their property without
just compensation. 62 In enacting child care ordinances and setting ex-
action amounts, municipalities, therefore, should perform careful statis-
tical analyses regarding projections of needs and apportionment of costs
so that the established constitutional benchmark is satisfied.
The second question concerns the benefits side of the exaction
scheme: whom will the dedication or fees benefit, and what needs may
they be used to ameliorate?' 3 As long as the proceeds of the exaction
inure primarily to the new employees in the office project, and not to
the general work force of the municipality, the exaction scheme is a
regulation, not a tax. That distinction is highly important as courts are
much more likely to invalidate tax-like exactions than those that resem-
ble presumptively valid regulations.'"
The San Francisco ordinance appears to address the benefits side
City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979).
116 See Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1977).
15 See Ivy Steel & Wire Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 401 F. Supp. 701 (M.D. Fla.
1975); Vail v. City of Bandon, 53 Or. App. 133, 630 P.2d 1339, review denied, 291
Or. 771, 642 P.2d 308 (1981).
11, See Connors & Meacham, supra note 116, at § 2.02(2), at 2-11. Connors and
Meacham set forth a proposed approach to examine municipal exaction schemes. While
their approach involves three questions, only two are germane to the discussion here.
1I0 Id. (citation omitted).
'6' See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
2 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. Through the fourteenth amendment, the
fifth amendment, which states "nor shall any private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation," applies to the states. See, e.g., Chicago, B & Q R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
'6 See Connors & Meacham, supra note 116, at 2-17.
14 See Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 151, at 422-27; see, e.g., Hollywood,
Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (exaction for parks
space not a tax because earmarked for specified purchase of capital facilities), review
denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1983); Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d
371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (exaction for roads is a tax when used for county-wide
purposes and not specific relevant community); Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d
888, 903 (Wyo. 1983) (exactions for water and sewer lines not a tax since used in a
narrowly defined manner).
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of the equation. It explicitly sets forth that the conditions for approval
by the City Planning Commission "shall require that the sponsor con-
struct child care facilities on the site of the office development project or
pay an in lieu fee to the City Controller which shall thereafter be used
exclusively to foster the expansion of and ease access to child care facili-
ties affordable to households of low or moderate income.1 5 With re-
spect to the on-site facilities, San Francisco thus will not have too great
a problem satisfying the benefits requirement because the space is spe-
cifically earmarked for use by the new employees of the office project's
new resident companies.
The payment of an in lieu fee, however, may be more problematic.
It leaves unanswered several questions. First, can San Francisco
demonstrate that most of the new downtown employees belong to the
low- and moderate-income groups? Perhaps the majority of new em-
ployees are in the moderate- to upper-, or upper-income categories.
Also, exactly whose children benefit from the Affordable Child Care
Fund-those of the new employees or the general community? In order
to clarify these issues the municipality should produce data establishing
that a majority of the new employees are of low- or moderate-income
and that it is primarily their children who will receive the benefits of
the Fund. Only then will in lieu fees, used "exclusively to foster the
expansion of and ease access to child care facilities," satisfy the benefits
requirement.
Part II of this Comment has argued that the San Francisco ordi-
nance is most likely, by its own terms, a valid development exaction.
However, given the attractiveness and usefulness of categorization in
the law, along with the novelty of child care ordinances, Part III will
seek to classify child care ordinances in an established area of exactions.
This classification will add validity to these ordinances. Consequently,
municipalities experiencing the related duet of increasing development
and a growing demand for child care can look to such ordinances as a
viable solution to their problems.
III. CHILD CARE FACILITIES AS SCHOOLS
Ordinarily, states must statutorily authorize municipal develop-
ment exactions before imposition takes place."66 Child care ordinances,
185 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., PLANNING CODE § 314.4(a)(1).
168 See P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 45.01 (1982); Subdivi-
sion Exactions, supra note 117, at 280. Statutory authorization is granted through
enabling acts, which typically give a municipality power to approve or disapprove sub-
division plans in accordance with certain guidelines. Id. Within these guidelines the
state can either specifically or generally require the developer to meet municipally-
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however, are not presently included under most municipalities' lists of
permissible exactions.167 While seeking specific statutory authorization
for such ordinances might be the most direct way to facilitate their
adoption, this Comment argues for an indirect approach. Indeed, by
first arguing for the categorization of child care ordinances as school
exactions, such ordinances then can be passed in a more expeditious
and appropriate manner than that offered by the direct approach.
The direct approach is less desirable than an indirect approach for
two significant reasons. First, social and political resistance to the ac-
knowledgement of child care as a legitimate object of legislation is sub-
stantial.""' Child care often is looked upon as an unimportant, less cru-
cial, area of societal interest; many continue to regard it as "just
babysitting." 69 Second, even if a child care ordinance was adopted as a
municipal development exaction, serious challenges could be made later
as to whether the exaction was legal.17
Municipalities, on the other hand, either already are authorized to
impose exactions for schools171 or easily could obtain a permissive
amendment to this end.172 Moreover, "school" is a more benign, less
requested exactions. Id. & n.63. See generally Connors & High, supra note 116, at 73-
75 (discussing enabling legislation and the judicial response thereto).
167 Cf Comment, Family Day-Care Homes: Local Barriers Demonstrate Needed
Change, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 481, 494-504 (1985) (arguing that the absence of
zoning for child care facilities among single-family dwelling accounts for the absence of
these facilities in residential communities).
16s See generally supra notes 68-91 and accompanying text.
169 See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 244.
170 Three issues arise when an exaction is challenged: 1) whether the municipality
possesses state authority; 2) whether it has properly applied its authority; and 3)
whether the exaction is a constitutional exercise of the municipality's police power with
respect to the particular developer making the challenge. See Subdivision Exactions,
supra note 117, at 279-83; see also Smith, supra note 122, at 9-16 (discussing chal-
lenges to subdivision exactions in general); Limit, supra note 117, at 402-03 (stating
that the determination of the constitutionality of an exaction rests on whether that exac-
tion amounts to a taking). Explicit state authorization obviates the first and second
inquiries-the first because the enabling statute exists, and the second because the leg-
islation explicitly includes the challenged exaction. See Subdivision Exactions, supra
note 117, at 280-82. At this point, the legality of the particular exaction depends on
whether the state's adopted legal standard for the reasonableness of the exaction is met.
See id. at 282-99; see also supra notes 130-58 and accompanying text.
171 See, e.g., Jordan v. Village of Menomonee, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442
(1965) (reviewing the municipal authorization granted under Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 236.45(1) (West 1957)); Board of Educ. v. Surety Developers, Inc., 63 I1. 2d 193,
347 N.E.2d 149 (1975) (reviewing the municipal authorization granted under ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 24, para. 11-12-5, 11-12-12 (Smith-Hurd 1973)); see also Bauman &
Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of American Practices, 50
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 57-58 (1987) (citing statistics concerning exaction re-
quirements for schools).
171 See D. HAGMAN & J. JEURGENSMEYER, supra note 114, at 119. Note that
this crucial point militates against the fact that many enabling acts do not offer explicit
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threatening, more acceptable term than "child care facility" in the eyes
of legislators and policymakers.173 In short, the classification of a child
care facility as a school mollifies the problem of statutory authorization;
and because ample precedent is available for the state's authorization of
school exactions, it is most expedient to categorize child care facilities as
schools.
A. The Educational Perspective of Child Care
Substantial authority exists in the psychological and educational
communities for the proposition that preschool child care is an educa-
tional experience;17 4 to resist terming a child care facility a school is to
ignore the documented relationship between child care and subsequent
stages of academic training. Child care and traditional schooling have
much in common.
First, the types of activities commonly engaged in at child care
centers and preschools are integral to a child's intellectual develop-
ment.1 " In keeping with the age-old maxim "play is learning and
learning is play," child care instructors involve young children in activi-
ties that are playful, yet also instructive in nature. 17  "In this way op-
portunities to learn are matched to a period in life when the child is
most interested in new explorations and mastery. 1 7 7 For instance,
playing with blocks or riding a tricycle aids the child in the develop-
authorization for school exactions. See Subdivision Exactions, supra note 117, at 275.
Moreover, within this context courts are amenable to suits challenging the exaction as
beyond the municipality's statutory authority. See, e.g., West Park Ave., Inc. v. Town-
ship of Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966) (lack of statutory authority barred
municipality from "extorting" exactions for school sites); Kelber v. City of Upland, 155
Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957), overruled on other
grounds, 29 Cal. 3d 656, 664, 630 P.2d 521, 525, 175 Cal. Rptr. 336, 340 (1981)
(enabling act does not authorize designation of municipal maps for school exactions).
17 Contra Grubb, Day Care Regulation: Legal and Policy Issues, 25 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 303, 326-27 (1985) (arguing for a distinction between day care facili-
ties and schools). Note that especially ardent legislators-those who oppose a direct
exaction for child care-might oppose a school exaction amendment if within it
"school" is defined to include child care facilities.
1714 See, e.g., I.J. GORDON, ON EARLY LEARNING: THE MODIFIABILITY OF
HUMAN POTENTIAL 15-22, 28-29 (1971) (advocating educational day care as a means
of offering the stimulus both craved and needed by children six months to school age in
order to maximize their intellectual and emotional growth); S. PRovENcE, A. NAYLOR
& J. PATTERSON, THE CHALLENGE OF DAYCARE 1-10 (1977) (arguing for the struc-
turing of day care and of its position within society in a manner best suited to nurture
the child's development).
178 See Rowbry, Preacademic Skills for the Reluctant Learner, in EARLY CHILD-
HOOD EDUCATION 201-28 (K. Allen & E. Goetz eds. 1982).
116 Id.
177 Id. at 201.
[Vol. 135:1591
CHILD CARE LAND USE ORDINANCES
ment of motor skills.17 8 Playing with other children in a supervised
setting introduces a child to social development and the world of in-
structional control.1 79 These activities, along with many others, contrib-
ute to a child's overall 'cognitive development, making the entire pre-
school experience an educationally significant one. As one commentator
has noted: "[Tihere are a number of programs, including day-care cen-
ters, where very young children are exposed to a variety of educational
experiences." 80
Second, a strong and valuable relationship between early child
care and subsequent schooling has been discovered. Studies show that
child care programs truly are pre-academic. 8 "Experiences during the
preschool years have often been identified as critical determinants of
later development of academic and social skills. For increasing numbers
of children, many of these crucial early experiences are occurring in a
day care setting." 82 A child, even at a very young age, is educable.
Indeed, the educational experiences that happen "during the first 24
months of life," often at a child care center, "are major determinants of
the quality of his motivation, expectancy of success, and cognitive abili-
ties during his school years."1 8 Undoubtedly, child care is something
above and beyond "just babysitting."
B. The Legal Perspective
The legal case for terming a child care facility a "school" for land
use purposes is best made by arguing from analogy. That is, because a
child care program has qualified as an educational program in other
legal contexts, ample support is available for its inclusion in the land
use law area.
Whether to consider a child care facility a school has already been
litigated in a regulatory context. In United States Department of Labor
178 Cooper & Holt, Development of Social Skills and the Management of Com-
mon Problems, in EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION, supra note 175, at 112.
179 Id. at 111.
180 V. DENENBERG, EDUCATION OF THE INFANT AND THE CHILD 2 (1970).
181 See Arend, Gove & Sroufe, Continuity of Individual Adaption From Infancy
to Kindergarten: A Predictive Study of Ego-resiliency and Curiosity in Preschoolers,
50 CHILD DEv. 950, 958 (1979); Belsky & Steinberg, The Effects of Day Care: A
Critical Review, 49 CHILD DEv. 929, 944 (1978); L. MILLER & J. DYER, FOUR PRE-
SCHOOL PROGRAMS: THEIR DIMENSIONS AND EFFECTS 131-33 (40 Monographs of the
Society for Research in Child Development No. 162, 1975); Barton & Schwarz, Day
Care in the Middle-Class: Effects in Elementary School (Aug. 1981) (paper presented
at the American Psychological Association Annual Convention, Los Angeles).
182 Hough, Nurss & Goodson, Children in Day Care: An Observational Study,
14 CHILD STUD. J. 31, 31 (1984).
183 V. DENENBERG, supra note 180, at 125.
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v. Elledge,1" the Tenth Circuit examined the issue of whether the
term "preschool," as found in the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),
included a day care center.1 8 5 The center primarily served working par-
ents' children ranging in age from infancy to twelve years. The debate
centered on the definitional purpose of a child care facility. Elledge
argued that while her center was both custodial and educational, the
custodial purpose should predominate for statutory definitional pur-
poses. In finding that the center was "essentially custodial in na-
ture," ' the district court disregarded the educational function of the
facility and held that it was not a preschool and thereby beyond FLSA
coverage.
8 7
The Tenth Circuit reversed on several grounds. First, it held that
the distinction between custodial and educational purposes was not dis-
positive of the case's outcome, since the statute itself did not make use
of that distinction. The court found that the statute included under its
coverage "both custodial and educational operations," ' 8 ranging from
institutions for the care of the sick and aged to schools for the handi-
capped. Thus, simply because a day care center is custodial as well as
educational, it does not become ineligible for inclusion under FLSA.
The court also was not persuaded that Congress's failure to define
"preschool" rendered it inappropriate for a court to do so. Relying in
large part upon authoritative dictionary definitions"8 9 and expert testi-
184 614 F.2d 247 (10th Cir. 1980). This case was an action for declaratory judg-
ment brought by the proprietor of the center. Her contention that the center was not a
preschool was based on an allegation-actually, a stipulation-that she had violated the
Fair Labor Standards Act. The court's finding that the center was a preschool thus
subjected Elledge to FLSA liability.
18 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(5) (1982). Section 203(s)(5) defines enterprises subject to
its coverage as including: "a hospital, an institution primarily engaged in the care of the
sick, ...a school for mentally or physically handicapped or gifted children, a pre-
school, elementary or secondary school, or an institution of higher education . . . ." In
1972, the word "preschool" was added: "Section 3(s)(4) of such Act (29 U.S.C.
§ 203(s)(4)) is amended by deleting 'an elementary or secondary school' and inserting
in lieu thereof 'a preschool, elementary or secondary school.'" Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(b)(2), (3), 86 Stat. 375 (1972).
188 614 F.2d at 249.
1'7 In reaching this conclusion, the trial court applied and followed Marshal v.
Rosemont, Inc., 584 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1978). This case stands in direct opposition to
Elledge, holding that certain Arizona nursery and kindergarten schools, serving chil-
dren from the age of infancy to five years, were not preschools for FLSA purposes. Id.
at 321. The court refused to conjecture as to the definition of "preschool" since Con-
gress itself did not define the term in the statute. It stated merely that where employers'
institutions were "essentially custodial in nature" and where they were "in no way
regulated by [the] State of Arizona as being a part of the state's school system," em-
ployers were not "preschools." Id.
188 614 F.2d at 250.
188 According to Webster's New International Dictionary, "preschool" is "a kin-
dergarten or nursery school where children of preschool age, sometimes in age groups,
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mony, the court stated that it was reasonable to call a day care center a
preschool: "[P]rofessional consensus recognizes that institutions for the
care of preschool aged children are generally educative in nature be-
cause they provide appropriate learning opportunities for preschool age
children in group settings with adult supervision."
19 0
Finally, in its effort not to be defeated by the absence of congres-
sional definition, the court looked to statements of the Wage and Hour
Administrator issued shortly after the Act was amended to include
"preschool":
'The term "preschool" includes any establishment or institu-
tion which accepts for enrollment children of preschool age
for purposes of providing custodial, educational or develop-
mental services designed to prepare the children for school in
the years before they enter the elementary school grades.
This includes day care centers, nursery schools, kindergar-
tens, Head Start programs and any similar facility primarily
engaged in the care and protection of preschool children.'""1
The court further quoted Wage-Hour Administrative Rulings concern-
ing the educative quality of preschools: "'[K]indergartens, nursery
schools, day care centers, and other preschools provide some elements of
basic education.. . . [A] critical foundation for intelligence and person-
ality is laid during the first six years of life.' "192
Based on the cumulative operation of this evidence, the Tenth Cir-
cuit concluded that "[a]pplication of FLSA may not be avoided by the
assertion of primary emphasis on custody and the rejection of the unde-
nied learning opportunities afforded to the children."19' In closing its
opinion, the court pronounced itself "convinced" that Elledge's enter-
prise was a preschool "within the meaning and intent of the 1972
amendments ....
The second analogy is found in tax law and policy. San Francisco
Infant School, Inc. v. Commissioner9 5 involved a declaratory action
concerning the classification of a day care facility for tax exemption
purposes. The facility challenged the Commissioner's determination
are entered for observation and social and educational training." 2 WFBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1954 (2d ed. 1934). "School" is "an institution for
teaching children" or "any place or means of learning or discipline." Id. at 2236.
190 614 F.2d at 250.
191 Id.
192 Id. (quoting Opinion Letter No. WH-294 [2 Wages-Hours] Lab. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 30,953 (Oct. 24, 1974)).
193 614 F.2d at 251.
19 Id.
195 69 T.C. 957 (1978).
1987] 1619
1620 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
that it did not qualify for tax exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code.1"' In order for tax exempt status to attach,
an organization had to be operated for exclusively educational pur-
poses.197 The Commissioner's argument was that "the provision of cus-
todial day care was a substantial noneducational purpose" ' of the fa-
cility. The court, however, rejected this argument, asserting that "the
custodial services were performed in a manner calculated to comple-
ment petitioner's educational purpose,"1 O9 and therefore "an integral
and inseparable part of that education." 200 The court was openly im-
pressed that the San Francisco Infant School concentrated on creating
an educational environment and curriculum tailored to young children's
needs. For instance, the program for children between the ages of six
and eighteen months featured language development, sensory/cognitive
development, motor development, individual self-awareness, and socie-
tal development. 01
Significantly, that the court acknowledged that day care centers
are, by definition, custodial in nature, does not and should not render
them altogether different from other types of educational facilities:
Although past cases and rulings granting exemptions as an
educational organization generally involve older students, we
see no reason why the tender age of petitioner's students
should preclude qualification. The record amply demon-
strates the importance of education for infants and peti-
tioner's efforts to optimize the educational experience for
them. The young age of petitioner's students may require
more custodial care than that which most schools provide,
but, as petitioner points out, custodial services of varying de-
gree are provided by schools at all levels of education.02
As this language demonstrates, it is sensible to classify a day care
facility as merely another kind of school for both practical and legal
lee I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976) (current version at I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982)).
197 69 T.C. at 964. "'The term "educational", as used in section 501(c)(3), relates
to - (a) The instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of improving or
developing his capabilities .... '" Id. at 965 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(d)(3)(i) (1960)).
191 69 T.C. at 964. Undoubtedly, the Commissioner borrowed his terminology
from the language of Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283
(1945) ("[T]he presence of a single noneducational purpose, if substantial in nature,
will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly educational
purposes.").
19 69 T.C. at 965.
200 Id.
20 See id. at 960-62 for an elaboration of the curriculum described.
202 Id. at 965.
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purposes. One of these legal purposes should be land use law. The
classification of child care facilities as schools for land use purposes will
inherently compel the inclusion of child care exactions in the list of
permissible exactions under state enabling act authority. As has been
demonstrated, this inclusion is a logical consequence of the educational
nature of child care.
CONCLUSION
The land use regulation response to the child care crisis is both
logical and feasible. Child care ordinances, such as the one passed in
San Francisco, if well drafted in a detailed and documented fashion,
should satisfy both the court-articulated "specifically and uniquely at-
tributable" and "rational nexus" tests. In the context of satisfying these
tests, child care development exactions are best viewed as school exac-
tions, since school exactions are presumptively valid, assuming proper
municipal authority. And from both an educational and legal perspec-
tive, child care facilities qualify as "schools."
In enacting its Child Care Ordinance, San Francisco has employed
an excellent method by which to address one of the greatest social chal-
lenges of our time: meeting the burgeoning need for accessible and af-
fordable child care services. This Comment encourages other munici-
palities to employ the established vehicle of land use law to meet the
challenges in their areas, thereby using San Francisco's innovation
upon the past as model legislation for the future.
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